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Abstract: Empirical Evidence and the Case for Foreign Aid
This paper addresses an important methodological question for a recent debate in global 
justice: What types of data are necessary for settling normative debates about foreign aid? 
Recently,  several  philosophers  have  considered  the  case  for  foreign  aid  and  have 
concluded  that  foreign  aid  is  either  ineffective  or  counter-productive.  This  paper 
considers what kinds of evidence those doing applied philosophy must use to support 
different claims about aid’s efficacy.  Then, using some of the best available data, this 
paper makes a strong case for at  least some foreign aid.  This paper’s methodological 
lessons, however,  are quite general.  It considers what types  of data are necessary for 
establishing the kinds of empirical claims often relied upon in the political philosophy 
and public policy literature.
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Empirical Evidence and the Case for Foreign Aidi
1. Introduction
In his  groundbreaking article, ''Famine, Affluence, and Morality,''  Peter Singer 
gave the following argument:
1) Suffering and death from lack of food and shelter and medicine are bad.
2) If we can do something to help prevent suffering and death from lack of food and 
shelter and medicine without sacrificing anything morally significant (or of morally 
comparable worth) then we should.
3) So we should help prevent this suffering and death by giving foreign aid.ii
Recently, several philosophers have questioned Singer’s implicit assumption that we can 
do something to  help prevent  suffering and death from lack of food and shelter  and 
medicine by giving foreign aid.iii These critics argue that foreign aid is either ineffective 
or counter-productive.iv This paper is not concerned to address the details of particular 
critics’ arguments (the critics appeal to a mixture of fundamental principles and empirical 
considerations).v Rather, this paper examines the kind of empirical justification necessary 
to arrive at sound conclusions regarding aid’s efficacy.vi Using the best available data, the 
paper then makes a strong case for at least some foreign aid programs. That aid can do 
some good may not be very surprising. Those who deny this claim must show that aid 
generally does more harm than good.vii Those who endorse it need only show that aid can 
do some good.  The  heavy burden  is  on  the  negative.viii Since,  however,  critics  have 
recently argued that Singer is wrong in claiming that aid can do some good, it is worth 
defending Singer on this point.ix 
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This  paper’s  methodological  lessons  are,  moreover,  quite  general.  It  considers 
what  types  of data  are necessary for establishing the kinds of empirical  claims often 
relied upon in the political philosophy and public policy literature. This is important as 
such empirical claims underlie debates about everything from free trade, to immigration 
policy,  and taxation  to population  control and many of the same problems that  beset 
critics of aid also undermine arguments in these other areas.x 
Before  making  the  case  for  some foreign  aid  programs,  the  next  section  will 
consider the different kinds of -- micro- and macro- level -- empirical data available.xi 
Macro-level data tells us how aid affects (or types of aid affect) all countries (or at least 
large regions). Micro-level data tells us how particular aid projects or small subsets of 
projects are doing. So the best data to use if one wants to conclude that aid is generally 
good or bad is macro-level data. Micro-data is better if one wants to know whether a 
particular aid program is good or bad.  
2. The Macro-Level Data
There  have  been  roughly  three  waves  of  macro-level  work  on  foreign  aid’s 
efficacy.xii Studies in all  three look, primarily at aid’s impact  on growth.xiii Over time 
these studies have become more sophisticated testing more complicated models of how 
different kinds of aid impact growth.xiv Some surveys of the literature, such as that of C. 
Michalopoulos and V. Sukhatme and H. White, suggest that the evidence is ambiguous.xv 
One of the latest and most comprehensive reviews by H. Hansen and Finn Tarp suggests, 
however,  that  ‘aid  works,  even  in  countries  hampered  by  an  unfavorable  policy 
environment.’xvi They question the robustness and appropriateness of models underlying 
many of the studies which deny this conclusion.
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Unfortunately,  the  evidence  about  aid’s  impact  on growth cannot  tell  us  what 
impact aid has on the global poor.xvii Even if aid increases growth, it may not reduce 
poverty.  Growth can increase  even if  the poor  become poorer as long as the rich or 
middle class gain more than the poor lose. Furthermore, different causes of growth affect 
the poor differently.xviii The growth impact of aid alone does not tell anything about how 
aid impacts poverty.xix
Fortunately, there are some relevant studies (though different ways of measuring 
aid’s impact on poverty yield different results).xx Peter Boone, for instance, shows that 
non-military aid did not reduce infant  mortality,  increase life  expectancy,  or increase 
primary schooling in the 1970’s and 1980’s.xxi More recently,  however,  Paul Mosley, 
John Hudson, and Arjan Verschoor find that aid positively impacts pro-poor spending in 
low income countries and usually reduces income poverty and infant mortality.xxii They 
find that aid has an especially large positive impact on poverty when there is not too 
much inequality or corruption. Boone’s study does not consider aid’s impact on infant 
mortality in low income countries in the 1970’s and 1980’s. So, even if Boone is right, 
Mosley et. al.’s study gives us reason to think aid generally reduced infant mortality in 
low income countries in the 70’s and 80’s. When inequality and corruption are low, there 
is also reason to think aid has a positive impact on income poverty in these countries.xxiii 
Others replicate some of these results finding even greater impacts of aid from European 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on infant mortality than Official  Bilateral  Aid 
which affects public sector spending.xxiv A recent study by Karuna Gomanee and Oliver 
Morrissey looks at aid’s impact on public expenditure, infant mortality, and the Human 
Development Index (HDI). Looking at a panel of countries from 1980-1998 Gomanee 
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and Morrissey find that aid increases public expenditures and decreases mortality rates 
(increasing the HDI).xxv Though there may not be enough macro-level data to conclude 
that aid generally reduces poverty, there is evidence in favor of some kinds of aid.xxvi 
Nevertheless, trying to make a general case for aid may be like trying to make a 
general case for investment.xxvii If Singer is right, what we really need to know is what 
investments to make and what aid to give.xxviii So the next section will turn to the micro-
level data to get more information.xxix 
3. The Micro-Level Data
Micro-level data can be  experimental,  quasi-experimental,  or  non-experimental  
(so can macro-level data, though most of it is quasi- or non-experimental). Most micro-
level  data  is  non-experimental.  Non-experimental  evidence  can  include,  for  instance, 
historical  records,  observational  studies,  and  anecdotal  evidence.  Both  quasi-
experimental and experimental evaluations help test the causal efficacy of aid programs; 
they help insure a study’s  internal validity. A study has high  internal validity when it 
captures the causal relationships between the particular program, policy, or process being 
evaluated and the particular outcome observed (no matter how unique the circumstances 
of the study). In  experimental studies people (or other units  of analysis)  are assigned 
randomly to treatment groups (e.g. those receiving aid) and comparison groups (e.g. those 
not  receiving  aid).xxx This  helps  isolate  a  program’s  impact  on  participants.  Quasi-
experimental studies do not use random assignment to insure internal validity.  Instead, 
researchers try to minimize selection bias (the bias that results from differences between 
the treatment and the comparison groups) in other ways.
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Experimental  data  is  often  best  for  insuring  internal  validity.xxxi Random 
assignment to treatment and comparison groups ensures that, on average, there will be no 
relevant differences between participants and non-participants. With a quasi-experimental 
design  participants  are  more  likely  to  differ  from those  in  the  comparison  group  in 
important ways.
An example will  help illustrate the advantages and limitations  of experimental 
and quasi-experimental studies. Suppose we want to evaluate an aid program to reduce 
malnutrition  in  a  particular  village.  If  villagers  or  researchers  decide  who  gets  to 
participate, there may be a selection bias. Many participants, for example, may be well 
nourished. Even if participants do better than non-participants researchers will not know 
if the program was successful. 
Using a quasi-experimental method may help. Consider, for example, one such 
method  --  regression  discontinuity  design.  With  regression  discontinuity  design, 
researchers use explicit selection criteria to select participants to receive aid. Aid might, 
for  example,  only  be  offered  to  people  who  are  underweight  for  their  age.  The 
comparison group would then be made up of those who are just over the weight limit.  
Next, researchers see if there is a discontinuity in how people fare just above and just 
below the cutoff point for inclusion in the program. 
Consider a graphical illustration of the results. The x’s indicate those who start 
out underweight and so receive aid; the o’s indicate those who start out over-weight. In 
the first graph aid has no effect. In the second aid has a good effect. On average, those 
receiving aid do better than those not receiving aid at the cut-off point (notice the 
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discontinuity).
Unfortunately, there can be differences between those just above and below the 
cutoff point and this can cause problems for this kind of quasi-experimental evaluation. 
Those just above the cutoff point might, for example, be able to participate in another aid 
program. If so, creating a comparison group made up of people right above the cut off 
point will introduce selection bias. Contrasting the treatment with the comparison group 
will  not  tell  us  whether  the  aid  program  is  successful;  we  will  not  know  how  the 
malnourished would have fared without aid. 
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True experiments better prevent selection bias; randomization gives us reason to 
think the treatment group is relevantly similar to the control group. It will not matter if 
those  above  the  weight  limit  can  participate  in  another  aid  program.  With  proper 
randomization, the comparison group will be made up of people who, like those receiving 
aid, are below the limit. So, it should be easier to conclude that a perceived effect is due 
to aid.xxxii
Experimental evaluations can help us determine the efficacy not only of particular 
programs but of different aid processes and policies. Many evaluations of microfinance 
test processes like particular loan or savings products, for instance.xxxiii Other evaluations 
the efficacy of different policies regarding, for example, the distribution of things like 
bed  nets.xxxiv And  it  is  possible  to  use  experimental  micro-level  studies  to  predict 
responses to macro-level policies (though larger samples are necessary to do this sort of 
research). For instance, researchers have recently evaluated how young women in Kenya 
respond to an AIDS awareness campaign that explains how older partners are more likely 
to have acquired HIV. They predict that the program will reduce HIV transmission rates 
amongst teenage girls in Kenya as it encourages young women to sleep with those in 
their age cohort.xxxv 
It  is important,  however, to be careful not to generalize beyond what the data 
warrants.  A  good  program  can  fail  because  the  staff,  beneficiaries,  culture,  or 
environment changes. Test projects can be more exciting and, so, more successful than 
normal programs just because they are test projects; this is called the Hawthorne effect. 
Fortunately,  there are ways to deal with such problems. Increasing the time span and 
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scale of the evaluation reduces the Hawthorne effect, for example. Testing programs in 
multiple locations at a large scale strengthens the case for replication or scaling up.
Often,  however,  experiments are hard to perform. Participants can drop out of 
treatment and those in the control group can sometime gain access to treatment illicitly.  
If,  for instance,  the program to combat malnutrition was offered at randomly selected 
schools, parents might move their children to schools offering the program (or away from 
such schools). This may bias results. Similarly, researchers may select a biased sample. 
If, for instance, researchers randomly select people to participate in a study from a non-
representative subgroup of a  population (say,  students  participating in an after-school 
program), they may inadvertently end up with results that will not generalize well to the 
other segments of the population. 
There are ways of dealing with some of these problems.  Double-blinding is a 
traditional  solution  to  minimizing  selection  problems.  If  neither  researchers  nor 
participants  know  who  is  receiving  treatment  that  will  prevent  much  intentional 
manipulation. But it may be hard to find an appropriate ‘placebo’ in the context of an aid 
program (parents and students usually know what kinds of programs are being carried out 
in  local  schools).  Worse,  inadvertent  selection  biases  can  be  just  as  problematic  as 
intentional selection effects. People may move out of a study area for reasons other than 
their desire to remain in or leave the program. Furthermore, the above example illustrates 
how researchers  may  select  biased  samples  precisely  because  they  do  not  recognize 
potential problems. 
Yet more problematic is the fact that, because researchers are selecting only a 
small number of participants (and doing so from a small population), we can expect that 
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even truly randomly selected groups will  exhibit  some potentially biasing regularities. 
One group may,  for instance,  include  more  boys  than the other  group. Theoretically, 
randomization guarantees that there are no differences between the treatment and control 
groups. But, this is only guaranteed if there is an infinite sample from which to choose. 
Obviously, in the real world, samples are not infinite. So, simply due to chance, the two 
groups may differ in significant ways.
To deal with potentially problematic differences between treatment and control 
groups  due  to  chance,  participants  may  be  matched  along  potentially  distorting 
dimensions  (e.g.  their  sex) before being randomized.  One person from each stratified 
matched pair would receive treatment. The other would become part of the control group. 
Alternately,  there  are  ways  of  taking  into  account  potentially  relevant  factors 
econometrically. In effect, however, using these methods or stratified matching, makes 
the  resulting  evidence  quasi-experimental  rather  than  fully  experimental.  (One  must 
assume that there are no other factors that explain observed differences that have not been 
taken into account).xxxvi Nevertheless, randomization is an important tool (amongst others) 
that helps us take into consideration potential differences between these groups. So, this 
paper  will  consider  experimental  as  well  as  quasi-experimental  micro-level  evidence 
regarding aid’s efficacy below. This evidence will let us conclude that there are lots of 
good aid programs that can probably be successfully replicated and scaled up.
4. Making the Case for Some Foreign Aid
Both advocates and critics of aid are concerned about how aid impacts the poor. 
Few explicitly consider  how we should measure aid’s impact  on the poor.  So before 
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arguing that there are lots of good aid programs, this paper will consider what a  good 
program looks like.
There  are  many  ways  to  measure  poverty.  We  might,  for  instance,  use  an 
assortment of indicators such as education and caloric intake. Alternately, we might use a 
unitary  measure  of  poverty.  Unitary  measures  either  specify  a  single  formula  for 
combining many disparate indicators of poverty or specify a single indicator (like income 
or Gross Domestic Product (GDP)). 
In discussing the macro-level data, this paper suggested that, if we care about how 
aid impacts the poor, growth in aggregate GDP is not a good (unitary) indicator of aid’s 
success. It cited studies that used a mixture of indicators. Better unitary measures are the 
Human  Development  Index  (HDI)  and  the  World  Bank’s  poverty  lines.  The  HDI 
combines (the logarithm of) GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP), literacy 
and primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates, and life expectancy at birth into a 
single indicator.xxxvii The World Bank uses (PPP) income-based measures of poverty.xxxviii 
The HDI includes more than income. This is a mark in its favor. Unfortunately, it 
has some problems. Poverty may be correlated with GDP per capita at PPP, literacy and 
primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates, and life expectancy at birth. But, it is 
not clear that the HDI is a better measure of poverty than the alternatives (education, 
income, and life expectancy may each be correlated with poverty in different ways and 
one of these may, alone, provide a better proxy for poverty than the combination). xxxix We 
need a philosophical account of poverty to decide which way of measuring poverty is 
best. But neither the United Nations Development Program nor Amaryta Sen who helped 
develop the measure has specified what set of basic functionings people need to be able 
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to avoid poverty.xl The point is not just, as Sen recognized, that the HDI does not provide 
a complete measure and conceals important dimensions of poverty.xli The point is that 
some  philosophical  justification  is  necessary  to  establish  that  the  HDI  is  even  a 
reasonably good indicator.
Worse, the HDI is relies on average income levels, so it cannot tell us how many 
poor people there are within a country.xlii A country where half of the population is well 
off, and half very poorly off, may have the same HDI as a country where everyone is 
doing equally, and moderately, well.xliii Germany, for instance,  has the 14th most equal 
income distribution, while Hong Kong is 84th. xliv  But Germany’s HDI of .930 very close 
to  Hong Kong’s .916. xlv This  last  problem is  so severe,  it  basically renders the HDI 
useless for our purposes.xlvi 
Because the World Bank’s poverty lines avoid this problem, we might use one of 
these indicators instead. But, the Bank’s poverty lines share another problem with the 
HDI that stems from the PPP exchange rates they rely upon.
PPP exchange rates make incomes comparable between countries and individuals 
in different countries. Consider a simple example of how to calculate such an exchange 
rate between two countries for a single good. Suppose it costs one dollar to get a bag of 
corn in the US and two pesos to do so in Mexico. The PPP exchange rate for corn would 
be 2:1 (.5 pesos to a dollar or 2 dollars to a peso). PPP exchange rates are calculated for 
many countries to find relative prices for many of the goods and services that make up 
GDP. They usually express the result in terms of US$ equivalents.xlvii
There  are  several  problems with relying  on PPP exchange rates  in  measuring 
poverty. First, the data these measures rely upon is questionable. PPP measures are based 
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on  the  Penn  World  Tables  (PWT)  and  the  International  Comparison  Project  (ICP) 
surveys. These surveys are of variable quality and often measure different things (e.g. 
income vs. consumption) they must be adjusted significantly to make them consistent.xlviii 
Furthermore,  these  surveys  do  not  have  adequate  coverage.xlix In  2005  China  was 
included for the first time and India for the first time since 1985. l So the surveys may not 
provide good estimates of poor countries’ incomes or the incomes of the poor within 
those countries.
Furthermore, the most common methods of comparing purchasing power make it 
seem  like  the  poor  are  doing  better  than  they  are.  The  Geary-Khamis  method,  for 
instance,  basically  averages  international  price  differentials  for  all  commodities 
weighting  ‘each  commodity  in  proportion  to  its  share  in  international  consumption 
expenditure.’li Essentially it considers how much it costs in each country to purchase the 
average ‘basket’ of goods consumed in all countries. The problem is that this ‘basket’ 
includes many services, for instance, that the poor do not buy but that are relatively cheap 
in developing countries.lii This makes it seem like the poor in these countries are doing 
better than they are. For, while food is relatively cheap in developing countries, it is not 
as  cheap  as  PPP  estimates  suggest.liii Services  have  also  come  to  make  up  a  lager 
proportion of the international consumption ‘basket’ over time. This makes it seem that 
the poor are doing better simply because of a change in the rich’s consumption patterns. 
Fortunately,  there  may be  some ways  of  ameliorating  the  problems with PPP 
measures.  For  calculating  the  World  Bank’s  poverty  lines,  it  might  help  to  compare 
purchasing power over a representative basket of goods the poor consume, for instance.liv
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Even if such changes were made, however, it is not clear that the World Bank’s 
poverty lines would accurately capture the amount of poverty in a situation. For, more 
than money matters to the poor and different people need different amounts of money to 
avoid poverty. Subsistence farmers whose states provide health care and education, for 
instance, may not need much money. So if aid harms the poor financially but brings them 
greater benefits of a different type, it may decrease poverty. Alternately, aid may bring 
small  financial  benefits  to  the  poor  but  harm the  poor  greatly  in  other  ways  and so 
increase poverty. Income is just one indicator of poverty. It may not be the best indicator.  
Having more than one indicator may be best.
So, this paper will consider what micro-level studies tell us about how aid impacts 
individuals’ access to things like education, health care, food, water, and shelter. It will 
assume that if aid helps people get these things, it reduces poverty. lv Of course, different 
indicators of poverty (like health and education levels) can exhibit opposite trajectories. 
Without a unitary measure, we may not be able to tell whether an aid program is making 
things better or worse overall.  It may also be impossible to tell  how much things are 
getting better or worse if, for instance, we find that an aid program helps some people get 
education but makes it less likely that others will get sufficient food. Sometimes, more 
than one thing may also be necessary to decrease poverty. Some medicines, for instance, 
may not work without food. Still, if a program helps people get basic water, food, shelter,  
health care, or education without making it harder for people to access these things that is 
evidence that the program reduces poverty. After all, helping people secure some of these 
things may help them secure others. If, for instance, children are well-nourished, they 
may learn more in school. At least I hope the advocates and critics of aid can agree on 
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this much. On this assumption, this paper will look at programs funded by many sources 
governmental and non-governmental. 
About ¼ of the world’s population is infected with worms like schistosomiasis 
and hookworm.lvi These infections can cause protein deficiency, anemia, and other kinds 
of malnutrition, which can interfere with children’s schooling. In parts of Kenya, more 
than  90%  of  school  children  are  infected  with  worms.lvii Internationaal  Chistelijk 
Steunfonds Africa, a Dutch non-governmental organization and the District Ministry of 
Health started de-worming children in Kenyan schools. Researchers wanted to carry out 
an  experimental  evaluation  of  the  program  in  Kenya’s  Busia  school  district. 
Unfortunately,  administrators  would  not  allow  random  numbers  to  determine  which 
schools would get the medication.  So the researchers used a heuristic for randomness 
based  on the  alphabet.lviii They found that  the  program decreased  absenteeism by 25 
percent or more.  Because the program lowered illness transmission rates,  absenteeism 
even decreased in nearby schools.lix The program was replicated in India. It was extended 
to provide iron supplements since lots of the Indian children were anemic. One year later, 
‘researchers found a nearly 50% reduction in moderate to severe anemia, large weight 
gains, and a 7% reduction in absenteeism among 4-6 year olds.’lx 
Most  of  the  world’s  poor  live  in  rural  areas  and farming  is  essential  to  their 
survival. So, aid is often directed at increasing agricultural yields and, thus, food supplies. 
In the rural Busia District of Western Kenya a Dutch NGO International Child Support 
decided to start a seed and fertilizer program. Parents of students in the local school were 
randomly selected to participate in the program for six years. The farmers were given 
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer to apply to a randomly selected plot of land and 
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hybrid  maize  to  plant  along  with  Di-Ammonimum  Phosphate  fertilizer  for  another 
randomly selected plot. A comparison plot was randomly selected for traditional seed and 
fertilizer. The NGO also provided help in the first applications, tracked farmers’ progress, 
and assisted with harvesting and weighing the crops. The quantities of fertilizer provided 
varied between growing seasons. Researchers found that the right amount of fertilizer and 
seeds could increase yields by over 90%.lxi Further, the evidence suggested that well-
timed  price  reductions  induce  some  farmers  to  purchase  and  apply  fertilizers 
themselves.lxii
Globally only five out of six boys and four out of five girls are in elementary 
school.lxiii The Inter-American Development Bank along with the Mexican government, 
created  a  conditional  cash  transfer  project  called  Progresa/Oportunidades  to  help  the 
poorest  educate  and  get  medical  care  for  their  children.lxiv Mothers  of  participating 
children  had  to  attend  nutrition  and  health  programs  (e.g.  prenatal  care,  nutrition 
monitoring,  well-baby  care,  immunization,  supplementation,  and  preventive  care 
programs).lxv Their  children  received  scholarships  to  go  to  school  --  with  larger 
scholarships  going  to  girls  than  boys.  When  the  government  wanted  to  expand  the 
program half  of  the  506 eligible  communities  were  randomly selected  to  participate. 
Comparing  educational  and  health  outcomes  in  these  communities  to  those  in  the 
comparison group, outside experts at the University of California Berkeley showed that 
children who stayed in the program for two years were about 40% less likely to fall ill  
than children  who did not  participate.lxvi They were also about  25% less likely to  be 
anemic, grew quicker, and returned to school more frequently after emergencies. lxvii On 
average, the percentage of children enrolled in first through eighth grades increased 3.4% 
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in participating communities.lxviii The percentage of girls who completed sixth grade rose 
14.8%.lxix Even  adults  benefited.  Parents  took  19%  fewer  sick  days,  on  average.lxx 
Progresa/Oportunidades  was  so  successful  that  it  was  extended  to  urban  schools 
throughout Mexico. Similar evaluations show that conditional cash transfer programs are 
successful around the world.lxxi 
In India only 35% of females and 61% of Males were literate in 1990. lxxii In 1994, 
Pratham,  an  Indian  non-governmental  organization  supported  by several  aid  agencies 
(including OXFAM, NOVIB, and AIF), began a remedial education program. Pratham 
hired local women to tutor children who were doing poorly in elementary school. An 
experimental  evaluation  of  the  program  randomly  assigned  tutors  to  half  of  the  98 
eligible schools Vandorara city (a similar experiment was performed in the L-ward of the 
Mumbai schools). The evaluation showed that the program ‘increased student test scores 
by .39 standard deviations.’lxxiii Moreover, the improvements were ‘largest for children at 
the bottom of the distribution.’lxxiv The program resulted in gains, per dollar, ten times 
greater than hiring new teachers and its returns improved over time. lxxv Pratham now runs 
similar programs in twenty cities for 161,000 children.lxxvi
There are many other successful programs that help people -- from microfinance 
to  school  voucher  programs.lxxvii Many  of  these  programs  have  been  successfully 
replicated and scaled up.lxxviii We can do some good with foreign aid. 
5. Conclusion
In arguing that we are obligated to aid the poor, Peter Singer assumes that we can 
use foreign aid to successfully ameliorate poverty.lxxix Recently, several philosophers have 
questioned this assumption. Many of aid’s critics fail to provide the requisite kind of data 
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to  make  their  case.lxxx So,  this  paper  has  canvassed  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
different kinds of empirical evidence for establishing different conclusions about aid’s 
efficacy. In doing so, it addressed the more general methodological question: What types 
of  data  are  necessary  for  establishing  normative  conclusions  in  debates  in  political 
philosophy and public policy? It defended one answer to this question. It suggested that 
macro-level empirical data is necessary to establish general claims about the efficacy of 
different policies, while micro-level experimental data is generally best for establishing 
claims  about  the  efficacy  of  particular  programs.  It,  thus,  provides  some  important 
guidance  for  resolving  debates  about  everything  from free  trade  and  immigration  to 
taxation and population control policy.lxxxi 
With regard to the debate about foreign aid, in particular, the paper argued that 
macro-level data is necessary to make a strong case regarding aid impact on the poor in 
general.  Unfortunately,  most  macro-level  studies  of  foreign  aid  do  not  address  the 
question of whether aid generally reduces poverty.  Nevertheless, this paper canvassed 
some relevant macro-level studies suggesting that certain kinds of aid reduce poverty. 
Furthermore, it argued that there are many good micro-level studies suggesting that at 
least some foreign aid programs are successful and can be replicated and scaled up. 
There are many questions for further research.  It  would be great to know, for 
instance, what factors contribute to successful aid programs, policies, and processes and 
how aid is distorted differently by different factors.lxxxii The practical importance of that 
knowledge  may,  however,  be  limited.  For,  this  paper  has  done  enough  to  establish 
Singer’s implicit empirical premise that aid can ameliorate poverty. So, if the rest of his 
argument is right, we can reach the important practical conclusion that we are obligated 
18
to provide aid that does work. Even if aid is generally a bad idea, we should not neglect 
the good we can do for some, even if we cannot completely ameliorate poverty. We need 
not only see the forest for the trees, we must not neglect the water for the seas. 
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